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This paper analyzes distribution of products to consumers who have preferences for a
particular product variant, such as a shoe of a given size. We assume that such con-
sumers will switch to substitute, though for them inferior, products if a suﬃcient dis-
count is oﬀered. When the cost of a retailer’s inventory is increasing in the number of
variants (sizes) carried, we show that a manufacturer who attempts to induce competi-
tive retailers to carry a particular size distribution will often fail if restricted to setting
a wholesale price for each unit. Retailers that oﬀer a less diverse assortment will be
able to undercut full-line rivals. Consumers who prefer the sizes that continue to be
carried beneﬁt from lower prices but other consumers end up with inferior products
and the manufacturer loses proﬁts. The manufacturer’s response to the narrowing of
the equilibrium size distribution will oﬀset some of the beneﬁts to customers for sizes
still carried. The manufacturer can restore its preferred sized distribution either by
absorbing the cost of retail inventories (through a policy of accepting returns of unsold
goods or via vertical integration) or by preventing retailers oﬀering only popular sizes
from discounting to attract customers from other product variants that the customers
would prefer if all prices were the same. We use our model to explain the narrowing
of size assortments observed after the passage of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of
1974. Our model also predicts that vertically integrated catalog merchandisers will oﬀer
larger assortments than store-based retailers. Finally, we analyze the attempt by Starter,
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1 Introduction
This paper was prompted by the observation of one of the authors (the odd-sized one)
that it has become far more diﬃcult to ﬁnd apparel and footwear products that ﬁt.
Retailer assortments of such products appear to be growing in terms of the number of
styles and colors available, but over the last quarter century, the standard assortment
of sizes handled by retailers, and particularly by discount retailers, has shrunk. The
inability to ﬁnd particular sizes does not arise from stock-outs, but rather from the
sizes in question not being stocked in the ﬁrst place. Limited size assortments are
a hallmark of discount stores. Deep discount stores such as warehouse clubs carry
particularly small size assortments.2 But the range of sizes oﬀered at department stores
also appears to be narrowing. Few department stores carry shoes in narrow or wide
sizes, and men’s shirts, formerly stocked in 1/2” collar increments and 1” sleeve lengths,
now typically can be found in only small, medium, large, and extra large sizes with,
normally, only two sleeve lengths per size.3 The phenomenon that concerns us is not
11995 Kurt Salmon Associates Consumer Pulse Survey, reported in Friedman (May 29, 1996)
2A trade press report on deep discount stores provides the following characterization: “Size assort-
ments and breadth of brands carried are narrow and limited, while depth of inventory on hand is deep.
Limited assortment ranges keep operating costs lower since wider assortments boost receiving and
warehousing costs, as well as data processing costs associated with more stock-keeping units (SKUs)
and space costs for more display. Limiting assortments to a few brands and a few sizes boosts volumes
sold per SKU and lowers purchase costs.” (Magrath, 1993).
3The change is typiﬁed by a customer who “asked a clerk at Banana Republic to ﬁnd him a shirt in
size 161/2, 35. The kid stared at him, baﬄed.
1merely that unusual sizes are disappearing from mass market retailers, but also that
assortments of products for consumers of common sizes are becoming more coarse.
Why has the range of sizes oﬀered contracted so substantially? The change does
not appear to derive from an increase in the cost of producing garments or shoes in a
wide variety of sizes: inspection of the size assortments of catalog and on-line retailers
show them to be as wide or wider than ever. Occasionally even apparel brands typically
carried in limited sizes can be found in a fuller size range at a few retailers, suggesting
again that production costs are not the governing factor.4 The problem appears to be
one of obtaining distribution for a wide array of sizes, not of producing that array.
This paper oﬀers an explanation based for the narrow range of sizes currently of-
fered based on the cost of holding inventories of multiple sizes and the willingness of
consumers to accept apparel items and shoes that provide a less-than-perfect ﬁt. We
‘There are two generations who don’t even know what that means,’ Fairchild says. (His neck measures
161/2 inches, and his sleeve length is 35 inches.)” See Mclaughlin (September 21, 1999).
A more extensive discussion (Fenton, August 22, 1999) reaches the same conclusion:
It’s true, shirts used to be widely available in exact sleeve lengths. Today, they are still
available, but certainly not so widely. Many manufacturers, in an ongoing eﬀort to cut
down on inventory, no longer make shirts in ﬁve exact sleeve lengths: 32, 33, 34, 35 and
36. Instead they make two sizes, referred to as 32/33 (sometimes called short) and 34/35
(long).
The actual sleeve lengths on these shirts are 321/2 for the shorter ones and 341/2 for the
longer. It’s obvious these two sizes are not going to be a precise ﬁt for a lot of men.
It is also obvious that this is a cost-cutting technique used in making less expensive shirts
(usually less ﬁne in other respects as well as shirt sleeve options) and, oddly, also in some
super-expensive designer shirts as well. The top-of-the-line shirtmakers who resort to this
strategy coyly claim it allows customers to have their sleeves custom-shortened to exact
speciﬁcations. But it really just saves the manufacturers money and the retail stores both
money and shelf space.
Shirts with exact sleeve lengths can still be found in up-scale department stores among
their better shirts, in top-drawer men’s specialty shops, such as the Shirt Store and in the
ﬁner catalogs, such as Lands’ End.
A similar problem exists for shoes: “Thousands of American women with C- and D-width feet endure
B-width shoes because that’s the only size most stores sell.” (Thompson, June 27, 1999). Men’s shoes
are also widely available only in one width, D.
4Fenton (August 22, 1999), referring to sleeve lengths, advises that “[y]ou can even ﬁnd them in
quality oﬀ-price clothing stores, such as Marshalls. They usually cost about $10 to $15 more than
similar shirts without exact sleeve lengths, and they may be well worth the diﬀerence.”
2show that a manufacturer who attempts to induce retailers to hold its preferred size
assortment when selling through a competitive retail sector is unlikely to be able to do
so if the only instrument under the manufacturer’s control is a constant wholesale price
per unit of its product. Retailers that oﬀer a less diverse assortment will be able to un-
dercut full-line rivals. Customers who prefer the sizes that continue to be oﬀered may
beneﬁt in the resulting equilibrium, but customers who prefer in-between or unusual
sizes, as well as the manufacturer, are harmed. The manufacturer’s response to the
narrowing of the equilibrium size assortment—increased wholesale prices—will oﬀset
some of the beneﬁts to customers for popular sizes.
Discounting is the source of the manufacturer’s problem in achieving adequate retail
inventories of its preferred size assortment. But even if the manufacturer cannot pre-
vent such discounting of its products, it can restore its preferred size assortment in a
number of ways. Our analysis attributes the narrowing of the size assortment to the re-
tailers’ inventory holding costs. Manufacturers can absorb the cost of retail inventories
through a policy of accepting returns of unsold goods or via vertical integration. Alter-
natively, the manufacturer can attempt to prevent retailers oﬀering only popular sizes
from discounting to attract customers from other product variants that the customers
would prefer if all prices were the same, using a form of resale price maintenance. Fi-
nally, the manufacturer can force retailers to hold and pay for the manufacturer’s full
assortment, though, as we shall see below, this forcing solution will often require that
dealers not be permitted to reallocate inventory among themselves.
We model consumers’ desired sizes in a spatial setting, an approach that has been
widely used in modeling vertical restraints (Winter, 1993; Mathewson and Winter, 1984).
Our model, however, rests on a “locational” characteristic such as size or style, where
diﬀerent consumers would choose diﬀerent products if all were oﬀered the same price.
3In contrast, Winter (1993) and Mathewson and Winter (1984) model consumers as having
heterogeneous preferences over price and quality of service, but service is vertically
diﬀerentiated—all consumers agree that more service is better than less. Other authors
employ spatial models of vertical restraints to consider strategic eﬀects (Gal-or, 1991;
Rey and Stiglitz, 1995; Bonanno and Vickers, 1988). Our approach has the surprising
consequence that a manufacturer with monopoly power over its market niche and full
ability to choose which product characteristics to oﬀer may nonetheless settle for an
inferior set of sizes. The reason is that retailers must be prevented from discounting
and thereby inducing consumers to accept a less-than-perfect ﬁt. Our results bear a
resemblance to results from models of retail outlet density (Gallini and Winter, 1983;
Gould and Preston, 1965; Reagan, 1986), but again, our manufacturer controls directly
the density of products oﬀered in location space.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a simple description of
our assumptions and present an example that demonstrates the process we have in
mind. Section 3 presents a model of assortment choice by retailers facing costly inven-
tories. Section 4 discusses the types of product characteristics that are most diﬃcult
to support in a competitive retail sector, reconciling the decline the the size assortment
with increases in variety measured in other dimensions. This section also applies the
theory to understand the motivation of Starter, a manufacturer of sports team apparel,
for preventing independent wholesaling for its products. Section 5 oﬀers concluding
results and suggestions for future research.
42 Inventories and Sizes: An Example
This section introduces our analysis by providing a much-simpliﬁed example of a retail
sector in which the size assortment oﬀered to consumers collapses due to discount-
ing. This example also illustrates the role that retail inventories play in governing the
assortment that will be oﬀered in equilibrium.
We begin by assuming that there is a single representative consumer whose ideal
size is either small, medium, or large. The consumer has a willingness to pay v = 1
for one, and only one, unit of the good in his or her ideal size. The consumer is willing
to move at most one size away from his or her preferred size, and places a valuation
of 1 − γ, 1 >γ>0, on a unit of the good one size diﬀerent from that consumer’s
ideal size. We thus assume that the consumer has a “right” size and an equal loss from
moving to an inferior size. In our formal model, we relax this assumption.
The manufacturer is assumed to be able to produce units of each size with marginal
cost of zero. There are no ﬁxed costs of production associated with adding a new size.
The manufacturer oﬀers units of each size to retailers at constant prices per unit of wS,
wM, and wL for small, medium and large, respectively. These prices are set prior to the
market period and remain ﬁxed throughout the period.
Retailers (at least two) observe the wholesale prices and choose their retail prices
simultaneously. Retailers then choose inventories. The consumer is able to observe
both retail prices and available inventories, and decides which unit to purchase. The
consumer’s size is his or her private information. From the perspective of the man-
ufacturer and retailer, the consumer’s size is equally likely to be small, medium, or
large.
In equilibrium, retailing of the manufacturer’s line is contestable—a retailer will
5adopt the line as long as it is expected to yield non-negative proﬁts. Competition among
retailers forces proﬁts to zero, and only one retailer stocks a particular size in equilib-
rium.
The manufacturer would prefer that the retailer stock a unit in each of the three
sizes. The customer would then ﬁnd his or her preferred size in stock, and would be
willing to pay a retail price, pr, equal to one. The retailer’s revenue would then be one,
so that it would earn zero proﬁts if the manufacturer sets the wholesale price equal
to 1/3. The manufacturer makes proﬁts of one and the consumer retains no surplus.
Unfortunately for the manufacturer, however, this solution, which is ﬁrst best for the
manufacturer, is not consistent with equilibrium.
Given a wholesale price of 1/3, the retailer would have an incentive to deviate. If the
retailer chose to sell only size M, setting a retail price of pr = 1−γ, all consumer types
would purchase from that retailer.5 Choosing one unit of size M to hold in inventory,
the retailer’s proﬁt would be (1 − γ)− 1/3, which is positive whenever γ<2/3 holds. A
customer whose ideal size is M would receives a surplus of γ, while a customer of size
S or L would obtain no surplus.
Since the manufacturer cannot obtain the integrated solution in which all three sizes
are ordered, it has two options. First, the manufacturer could raise the wholesale price
to 1 − γ, anticipating that only size M would be ordered. Size M would be oﬀered at a
retail price of 1−γ, all consumers would purchase, and the manufacturer’s proﬁt would
be 1 − γ. The manufacturer’s second option is to induce sizes S and L to be ordered,
but not size M. To do so most proﬁtably, the manufacturer would set a wholesale price
of 1/3 for sizes S and L, and a prohibitively high wholesale price exceeding 1for size
M.6 The retail prices for sizes S and L would be 1, so medium-sized consumers would
5Lowering pr slightly below 1 − γ would induce all consumer types to strictly prefer the retailer.
6Since this is a motivating example, and a general framework based on ﬁxed inventory costs is
6not purchase, and the manufacturer’s proﬁt would be 2/3.
Comparing options 1and 2 above, we see that option 1will be chosen when we
have 0 ≤ γ<1/3, and option 2 will be chosen when we have 1/3 <γ<2/3. In both
cases, the outcome is a limited assortment of sizes available. For example, suppose that
0 ≤ γ<1/3 holds. Only size M is available, and total surplus falls from the vertically
integrated solution. Consumer surplus is now γ/3. The decline in expected total surplus
is a consequence of ill-ﬁtting clothes for small and large consumers—these consumers
could be ﬁtted properly if the retail sector could be induced to carry all three sizes.
The transfer to a medium consumer occurs because he or she obtains the beneﬁt of the
price cut to induce other consumer types to wear clothes that do not ﬁt properly.
Thus the reason that the manufacturer is worse oﬀ is that when the retailer discounts
its suggested list price, customers do not receive their most-preferred product variants,
even though it costs the manufacturer nothing to produce for each of the three possible
sizes of customer. The manufacturer does not pay for the units held as inventory for
each of the sizes, but the retailer does, and therein lies the problem. It is a problem with
a ready solution—so long as the manufacturer bears the cost of retailer inventories, as,
for instance, when it accepts returns of unsold products for full credit, it can prevent
discounting. The manufacturer could equivalently provide its products to dealers on
consignment. Such arrangements became far less common a century ago, however,
when retailing shifted from commission sales and manufacturer’s representatives to
mass distribution (Chandler, 1977). Retailers now typically take title to the goods they
sell when they obtain those goods from the manufacturer, leading to the misalignment
formally analyzed below, we omit the details. Basically, if the medium-sized consumer purchases, say,
size S, then the wholesale price for size S must be less than the wholesale price for size L in order to
be consistent with the equilibrium of the retail subgame. However, the wholesale price for size L can
be at most 1/3. Therefore, manufacturer proﬁts cannot exceed 2/3 when only sizes S and L are carried.
7of incentives to hold inventories that is at the heart of our analysis.7
If the retailer does indeed take title to the goods it sells or holds in inventory and
has no recourse to returns of unsold goods, the manufacturer can still obtain its pre-
ferred inventories by imposing vertical restraints. If the manufacturer can impose a
price of one through resale price maintenance, the retailer will hold the desired stock.
Resale price maintenance is, however, a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.8
Another alternative is full line forcing. In more complex settings, this approach is lim-
ited by the retailer’s ability to reorder the sizes it needs. A manufacturer can ship a
full assortment, but if it cannot predict accurately which goods a particular retailer will
sell, the manufacturer cannot ensure that the assortment will stay in stock. We will see
below, in Section 4, that retailer transshipping can also defeat forcing if the distribution
of preferred product characteristics diﬀers across markets.
The example provides a simple illustration of the diﬃculty a manufacturer faces
when selling a line of products. All that is required is that the retailer pay for inventories
that it may not be able to sell, and that it be able to reduce those inventories by limiting
the breadth of its line. We demonstrate these points more formally in the model that
follows.
3 The Model
This section provides a formal treatment of the ideas introduced in the preceding ex-
ample. The market we model consists of a single manufacturer and an inﬁnite number
7Note that another consequence of mass distribution is that retail establishments will often shift
from brand to brand, suggesting that our characterization of retailing for a particular product as con-
testable is a reasonable assumption.
8For a more complete discussion, see Marvel (1994).
8of potential entrants into the retail market.9 The space of possible products is denoted
by the real line, which could be interpreted as a product characteristic such as color
or length, but which, for convenience, we will refer to as size. A point on the real line
represents a particular size of the manufacturer’s product. Consumers are distributed
along the real line, where a consumer at location t is said to be size t. A consumer of
size t who pays a price, p, to purchase a product of size τ receives utility given by:
u(t,τ) = v − z | t − τ |− p
where v represents a consumer’s valuation of consuming his or her ideal size. We
assume that consumers are evenly distributed across the real line, and we normalize
the measure of consumers within any interval of length one to be one.
Themanufacturerfacesaﬁxedcost, Fm, foreachsizeoﬀered. Wenormalizemarginal
production costs to be zero. For each size carried by the retailer, the retailer also incurs
a ﬁxed cost, which accrues to the manufacturer. Our interpretation is that the retailer
must have a certain number of units in stock at all times, F, and that these inventories
go to waste after the market period is over.10 We assume that returns policies, consign-
ment, or other arrangements equivalent to vertical integration, are impossible. Each
retailer seeks to maximize expected proﬁts, and the manufacturer seeks to maximize
proﬁts per consumer.11 To guarantee that a vertically integrated monopolist would
9We assume that an inﬁnite number of retailers are prepared to adopt one or more components
of the manufacturer’s line so long as the components in question are expected to yield nonnegative
proﬁts.
10As discussed in the example, we need the retailer to face a positive probability of unsold goods,
which cannot be returned to the manufacturer. In order to support these inventories, which must be
paid for by retailers in advance, the manufacturer will be forced to set a wholesale price below the
ultimate retail price. Retailers might then have an incentive to cut their prices, carry a smaller line
of products, and proﬁtably induce consumers to switch away from their ideal size. Our ﬁxed cost
corresponds to the certainty that there are unsold goods, which is far simpler than the alternative
where demand is random.
11We assume that consumers are evenly spread across the real line in order to have a symmetric
9wish to serve the market, we assume that v ≥
√
2Fmz holds, which is necessary and
suﬃcient for monopoly to be proﬁtable.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the manufacturer chooses a countable
set of sizes to oﬀer, {...,τ −2,τ −1,τ 0,τ 1,τ 2,...}. We adopt the convention that size 0
is oﬀered, τ0 = 0. The manufacturer speciﬁes a wholesale price, p
w
i , for each size
i that it chooses to oﬀer. Next, a large number of potential retailers simultaneously
announce a retail price, p
r
i , for each size that they are prepared to carry. Given the
retail prices, consumers (who behave non-strategically) purchase one unit from the ﬁrm
oﬀering them the highest utility, if nonnegative, or choose not to purchase if all ﬁrms
oﬀer negative utility.12 Retailers incur the ﬁxed cost, p
w
i F, for each size that one of
their customers demands.13
Our solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium to the retail subgame, all retailers must receive zero proﬁts.
Proof. Suppose not, so some retailer receives positive proﬁts. We know that there
must be potential retailers who have not entered, because of the ﬁxed cost. One of these
retailers could instead enter the market, undercutting the proﬁtable ﬁrm’s retail price,
by ε>0, for each size the proﬁtable ﬁrm carries. For suﬃciently small ε, this deviation
must be proﬁtable.
outcome. To avoid boundary eﬀects, we require an unbounded product space. Unfortunately, this
also leads to unbounded total proﬁts for the manufacturer. We are conﬁdent that our equilibrium
spacing of sizes emerges in the limit, as we consider games with a bounded product space (where the
manufacturer maximizes total proﬁt).
12If two retailers tie for the lowest retail price for a give size, then all consumers purchasing that size
are assumed to select the same retailer, for example, the retailer whose name comes ﬁrst in alphabetical
order. This assumption ensures that, in equilibrium, one ﬁrm serves the entire market for the size in
question, but this retailer is still pressured to price at average cost. This is a standard assumption to
guarantee contestability.
13The cost is ﬁxed in that it does not depend on the quantity sold, but it depends on the wholesale
price. This is in keeping with our interpretation of the cost as representing unsold inventories.
10Lemma 2 In any equilibrium to the full game, only one retailer can carry any particular
size.
Proof. Suppose not. If there were two retailers selling a particular size, and receiving
nonnegative proﬁts, then they must each pay the ﬁxed cost. (It is inconsistent with
equilibrium for the retailers to be earning negative proﬁts in this size, because one of the
retailers could increase its price on this size and avoid the ﬁxed cost, without aﬀecting
revenues on any other size.) However, a potential retailer could slightly undercut the
two retailers, thereby receiving (almost) the combined revenues of the two retailers, but
at lower cost.
We conclude that, in equilibrium, there is only one retailer carrying a given size, and all
retailers receive zero proﬁts.14
We will construct a symmetric equilibrium, in which there is a constant distance, d∗,
between sizes oﬀered by the manufacturer, all sizes are oﬀered at the same wholesale
price, all sizes oﬀered are carried by retailers, and all retailers charge the same price.
Consumers therefore purchase from the nearest retailer, so the retailer carrying size τ
serves all consumers who purchase and are located between τ − d∗/2 and τ + d∗/2.
Also, the consumer whose ideal size is exactly equidistant between the two nearest sizes
oﬀered (for example, size d∗/2) receives zero utility by purchasing in equilibrium.
Let [ti,t
 
i] denote the interval of customers served in equilibrium by the retailer
selling size τi. Then, from Lemma 1, we have the contestable markets condition,
14We are assuming that established retailers can choose whether or not to carry the manufacturer’s
line, and since the product has no scrap value, there are no mobility barriers for this market. While the
retailer’s inventory is sunk, there is no carry-over to the next period, so the retail market is contestable
(Baumol, 1982). Our model does not require that a separate retailer sell each size—one retailer could be
selling all of the sizes. As we will see below in Section 4, one solution to the manufacturer’s problem










i − ti) − p
w
i F = 0. (1)
Also, let siz denote the equilibrium utility received by the consumer at location ti from
purchasing size τi, and let s
 
iz denote the equilibrium utility received by the consumer
at location t
 
i from purchasing size τi. Then the retail price must satisfy
p
r
i = v − (τi − ti)z − siz = v − (t
 
i − τi)z − s
 
iz. (2)
A necessary condition for equilibrium is that retailer i cannot proﬁt by slightly undercut-
ting p
r
i and expanding its customer base. The speciﬁcation of this no-local-undercutting
constraint depends on whether the expansion of the customer base encroaches on zero,
one, or two neighboring retailers. We now derive the no-local-undercutting constraint
for the case in which the retailer faces competition from both sides. (For the other two
cases, the condition would be even stronger, since it is more tempting to undercut.)
If retailer i cuts its retail price to increase its customer base by δ on both sides, the
consumer at location ti −δ must be indiﬀerent between purchasing from retailer i and
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i } for each integer i, subject only to equations 1, 2, and the
(weak) no-local-undercutting constraint, (5).15




i } for each integer i, to maximize proﬁts
(per consumer) subject only to equations (1), (2), and(5), then there is a solution that
satisﬁes, for all i, si = 0, s
 
i = 0, and



























Proof. First we look at the conﬁguration for a single market that maximizes the man-

























where constraints 1, 2, and 5 only have to hold for market i. In equation 8, the ﬁrst
term represents revenues from output that the retailer sells to consumers, the second
term represents revenues from output that is not subsequently sold to consumers (since
15In particular, we do not impose the constraint that a retailer cannot proﬁt from a large deviation
that attracts all of the customers from neighboring markets.
13retailers’ ﬁxed costs accrue to the manufacturer), and the third term represents the man-
ufacturer’s ﬁxed cost, since the number of sizes oﬀered per unit interval of consumers
is 1/(t
 
i − ti). Since only relative positions matter, we can think of the manufacturer as
choosing (t
 









i . The choice of (τi −ti) then determines si and s
 
i from equation 2.
Since (τi−ti) only aﬀects how total surplus is allocated across consumers, and whether
surplus is nonnegative, we can impose (τi − ti) = (t
 
i − τi), without loss of generality,
which implies si = s
 
i ≡ s. With some substitutions, and letting d stand for (t
 
i − ti),w e

























If the parameters are such that the no-undercutting constraint, (11), does not bind,
then the solution is s = 0,d=
 
2Fm
z , and pw such that equation 10 is satisﬁed. If






















14Substituting the right side of (13) for d in the objective function, (9), it can be








4 , and pw such that equation 10 is satisﬁed. Therefore, the optimal





















Because this optimal conﬁguration gives all marginal consumers zero surplus, si =
s
 
i = 0, the manufacturer can “stack” these markets together, with no gaps. Let us




i } for each integer
i, to maximize proﬁts (per consumer) subject to equations 1, 2, and 5. Let τi = id∗ hold,
let p
w
i be determined by equation 7, and let p
r
i be determined by (1). It is easy to see
that ti is the midpoint between τi−1 and τi, and that si = 0. In other words, equations
(1), (2), and (5) are satisﬁed, and the manufacturer achieves the optimal conﬁguration
derived above. 
Proposition 4 There is a symmetric equilibrium in which the distance between any two




d∗+F , andeach retail price is (v −
d∗z
2 ).
Proof. Given the sizes oﬀered and the wholesale price, the zero retail proﬁt condition
requires that the retail price is bid down to (v −
d∗z
2 ). Inequality 5 is satisﬁed, so there
is no incentive for a retailer to lower its retail price to expand its customer base. To
show that the retail subgame is in equilibrium when all retailers choose a retail price of
(v −
d∗z
2 ), we must show that large deviations, to capture entire neighboring markets,
are not proﬁtable.16
16Equation 3 is not valid for large deviations. When the retailer oﬀering size 0 chooses δ =
d∗
2 , so the
consumer at location d∗ switches to size 0, all of the consumers in the interval [d∗,
3d∗
2 ] also switch
15Without loss of generality, consider the case of a retailer oﬀering size 0 at the price





size 0, for 0 ≤ δ<
d∗

















∗ + 2δ + F). (15)
Substituting t
 










2 ) into equation 3, we know
that a retailer cannot proﬁt from carrying size
(A−1)d∗
2 and having the same marginal
customer, at location
Ad∗
2 + δ. From (3) and (15), we can derive the following:
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r











The right side of (16) is increasing in both A and δ, so if we can show that the
expression is nonnegative for A = 3 and δ = 0, it must be nonnegative for all A and δ
in the speciﬁed ranges. Since we have   π
r
i ≤ 0, the right side of (16) nonnegative would
imply that   πr(A,δ) ≤ 0 holds as well. Substituting A = 3 and δ = 0 into (16), we must
show
2zd























to size 0. This follows from the linearity of the utility function.
16Some straightforward calculations indicate that inequality 18 is implied by the deﬁ-
nition of d∗ in (6).





2 + δ], purchase size 0, for
d∗





2 ] , are willing to purchase size 0, so this case has already been
considered (with δ = 0).
We have shown that the retail subgame is in equilibrium. Since conditions 1, 2,
and 5 are necessary conditions for any equilibrium of any retail subgame, it follows
from Lemma 3 that the manufacturer cannot improve on its objective, either.
Because of the inﬁnite commodity space, the manufacturer’s objective is unaﬀected
if, say, it leaves a ﬁnite amount of the commodity space unexploited. Thus, there may be
other equilibria in which the manufacturer sets prices and the distance between sizes of-
fered as characterized in Proposition 4, except for a ﬁnite section of the product space.
We focus on the “natural” solution in which the eﬃcient pattern holds everywhere,
rather than almost everywhere. Also, Proposition 4 justiﬁes restricting attention to the
game where the manufacturer must choose a constant wholesale price and distance
between sizes oﬀered. That game would have a unique equilibrium (our characteriza-
tion above), which remains an equilibrium if the manufacturer’s strategy space is not
restricted.
Corollary 5 There exists F
m
> 0 such that, when Fm ≥ F
m
occurs, then the manufacturer
oﬀers the same set of sizes as a vertically integratedﬁrm wouldoﬀer. When Fm < F
m
occurs, then the manufacturer oﬀers fewer sizes (i.e., more distance between sizes) than
an integratedﬁrm wouldoﬀer.
Corollary 5 follows from Proposition 4 and equation 14 and the fact that the vertically
17integrated ﬁrm chooses s = 0 and d = d∗ to maximize (9) subject only to constraint 10,
exactly as the manufacturer does when the constraint given by (11) is not binding.
We now provide some comparative statics results.
Proposition 6 i. If the equilibrium spacing is the same as the vertically integrated












ii. If constraint 11 binds, so the equilibrium spacing is coarser than the vertically inte-












iii. The coarser spacing induces a higher wholesale price, so that solving equation 10




Proof. Part (i) follows immediately from equation 14. For part (ii), ∂d∗/∂Fm =




a2F2 + bF − aF, (19)
with positive parameters a = 3/4 and b = v/z. From (19), one can show that ∂2d∗/∂F∂b >
0, which implies ∂d∗/∂F > ∂d∗/∂F |v/z=0= 0.
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Fz ). This expression can be treated as a function of the
single positive variable, v/Fz, whose value is zero at v/Fz = 0, and whose derivative is
positive. Therefore, ∂pw/∂d > 0 (when evaluated at d∗).
Proposition 6 says that when the spacing of sizes in equilibrium is the same as in the
vertically integrated solution, the assortment of sizes oﬀered shrinks with increases in
the manufacturer’s ﬁxed cost, or with decreases in consumers’ “transportation cost,”
that is, their intensity of preference for a particular size. A retailer’s inventory require-
ment is not relevant, since the wholesale price adjusts to ensure zero proﬁts and achieve
the vertically integrated outcome. The consumers’ willingness to pay for an ideal size,
v, aﬀects the equilibrium retail price and manufacturer’s proﬁts, but does not aﬀect
the spacing between sizes oﬀered in equilibrium.
When constraint 11 is binding, the manufacturer’s ﬁxed cost is irrelevant for the
equilibrium spacing, which is instead determined by the need to prevent retailers from
discounting and inducing consumers to switch sizes. Fewer sizes are oﬀered when the
retailers’ﬁxedcostisgreater, becausethereisagreaterincentivetodiscountandexpand
one’s customer base. Fewer sizes are oﬀered when consumers’ transportation cost is
lower, because consumers are more tempted to switch sizes in response to discounting.
Fewer sizes are oﬀered when v is greater, because the manufacturer charges a higher
19wholesale price to extract this additional surplus, which forces the manufacturer to
oﬀer fewer sizes (since ∂pw/∂d > 0 when evaluated at d∗).
4 When Does Variety Shrink? The Starter Case
A trip to a “category killer” store for any of the numbers of product classiﬁcations that
have such stores will likely convince the reader that variety in assortments is often not
lacking. We have remarked that footwear is a product for which the size assortment has
become much more limited, but customers do not want for a plethora of styles of shoes.
These contrasting observations suggest that if our theory is to be credited, it must apply
only to some product characteristics. Consideration of our assumptions makes it clear
that the customer must have a clear preference for one component before he or she
visits a retailer in search of that component. When a consumer shops for styles, the
sheer variety of styles oﬀered at a particular location can be an attraction in and of
itself if that consumer does not set oﬀ with a particular style in mind. In contrast, a
consumer is likely to know which size he or she prefers, and will be willing to pay a
premium for that particular size. Variety may be the spice of life, but it does little good
for an extra large shopper to be oﬀered a small size of apparel.
Our analysis is not limited to sizes, however. Consumers often form allegiances to
sports teams, often, but not always the “home” team from the consumer’s community.
Such consumers may wish to display their attachment to a particular team by wearing
apparel with the team’s logo or symbol prominently displayed. Starter Sportswear17
was a licensee of all of the major sports leagues, Major League Baseball, the National
17The details of the Starter case are from the opinion in Trans Sport, Inc., v. Starter Sportswear, Inc.,
964 F.2d 186 2nd Cir., 1992) (hereinafter Starter). The opinion in this case was written by then-retired
Justice Thurgood Marshall.
20Football League, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League.
Each league authorized Starter to produce “authentic” satin team sports jackets, that is,
copies of those worn by the athletes and coaches in the respective league. Starter sold
these jackets through retailers which included Trans Sport,18 a retailer that sold through
its own direct-mail catalogs as well as through a retail outlet of its own. But when Trans
Sport began to resell Starter jackets to retailers nationwide, Starter refused to ﬁll its
orders and instituted a policy of banning transshipments or resale to unauthorized
locations.
Starter had imposed a minimum order requirement on its retailers, but one that
was tailored to the market in which each retailer operated. Starter described its policy
as one “of selling only to retail outlets which carry a representative amount of the
line as deemed appropriate by Starter in light of the type of retail outlet, the status of
Starter’s line or lines of merchandise, and marketing conditions." While Trans Sport tried
to argue that this was an illegal tie designed to force Starter’s customers to purchase
other merchandise from Starter (caps, T-shirts, and so on) as a condition for receiving
Starter jackets, it was unable to present any evidence to this eﬀect, leading the court to
conclude that this policy was designed to require dealers simply to carry a signiﬁcant
portion of its line of jackets.
Trans Sport found an apparently proﬁtable business opportunity in ordering the
full line from Starter in large quantities, but then reselling to retailers (for a $7 per
jacket fee) in quantities that fell short of Starter’s minimum order requirement. That is,
retailers could pay a premium to obtain only the jackets that were most likely to have
high inventory turnover in their areas.
18Trans Sport was actually the sister company of Stickley, the retailer and direct-mail company that
began transshipping to retailers. To avoid confustion, we will use “Trans Sport” to refer to both Stickley
and Trans Sport.
21Starter justiﬁed its refusal to deal with Trans Sport using standard economic ar-
guments developed to explain resale price maintenance. As Justice Marshall noted:
“Starter’s intrabrand restrictions also help to convey to consumers a message of quality;
consumers with little knowledge of league products may ﬁnd a surrogate for informa-
tion ‘in the very fact that a dealer with a reputation for handling quality merchandise
stocks a particular brand …For some consumers, this is valuable information.’ ”19
While we are sympathetic to this interpretation,20 it does not explain why Starter
forced its full line on retailers, nor does it explain why discounters were willing to pay a
premium for individual units when by doing so they could avoid purchasing the full as-
sortment of jackets that Starter oﬀered for their market. That is, Starter’s concern with
forcing retailers to carry its full assortment can be separated from its desire to keep its
jackets out of discount outlets.21 More importantly, Trans Sport’s proﬁt depended on
its ability to purchase “large volumes of Starter team jackets,”22 and to break these pur-
chases into assortments that were more appealing to individual markets than Starter’s
own assortments, even as they commanded a $7 plus delivery fee premium over the
Starter oﬀerings.
Our explanation for the success of the Trans Sport transshipments and for Starter’s
objection to the Trans Sport’s activities is that retail customers could lower their costs
of inventory by ordering only the jackets most in demand in their communities, even
though some customers in each community might prefer jackets for teams other than
the local teams. The retailers that carried limited lines need to oﬀer those lines at
19Starter, at 190, quoting Areeda (1989, pages 184–185).
20Indeed, the Areeda treatment of dealer certiﬁcation referenced by Justice Marshall (Id.) is in turn
based upon Marvel and McCaﬀerty (1984). See Areeda (1989), p. 184, fn. 12.
21Starter “preferred to deal with the ‘Macy’s of the licensed apparel industry, not the K-Marts of the
world.’” Trans Sport v. Starter, 775 F. Supp. 536, at 543, quoting a plaintiﬀ statement. Starter sold
primarily to sports specialty stores, though its largest 16 customers included mass market retailers
J.C. Penney and Sears.
22Id., at 538.
22prices lower than their full line competitors, but such discounts would be possible de-
spite higher unit costs owing to lower inventory costs. The result for Starter would be
a reduction in the number of retailers willing to hold the full jacket line, and less than
complete satisfaction on the part of customers induced to buy jackets for the local team
when in fact their preferences lay elsewhere. Just as will shrinking size assortments, re-
tail competition for team jackets lower the variety of such jackets oﬀered to consumers
in a particular locality.23
5 Summary and Conclusions
Our analysis indicates that manufacturers will often ﬁnd it diﬃcult to maintain the
variety of assortments of their products that they wish retailers to carry. They can
increase the breadth of retailer assortments by imposing vertical restraints such as
resale price maintenance or full-line forcing on retailers, but in doing so they face legal
obstacles. Indeed, we believe that the narrowing of size assortments that took place
soon after the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 197524 removed from the Sherman Act,
§1, two provisos granting anti-trust exemption to State fair trade laws. This change
meant that resale price maintenance defaulted to its prior status as a per se violation
of the antitrust laws. The law thus reduced the ability of manufacturers to protect their
full assortment dealers from discounting.
Ouranalysissuggeststhattheconsequencesofthischangeinthelawwerepredictable—
23One may be concerned that Starter’s policy could have been attempt to separate markets in order
to practice price discrimination. The Starter opinion contain no suggestion that the wholesale price
of a jacket varied across retailers, and, indeed, the price charged by Trans Sport for a jacket was
substantially in excess of the per unit price charged by Starter to retailers directly. The court considered
and dismissed price discrimination as a possibility: “Moreover, we see no traces of the burdensome
eﬀects generally associated with illicit monopolistic activity: price maintenance or discrimination or
increased barriers to entry at the manufacturing level.” Starter, page 191.
24Public Law 94-145.
23size assortments should have fallen, as indeed they did. It is more diﬃcult, however, to
establish whether this change in retail behavior was undesirable. Consumers preferring
common sizes may have beneﬁted, while odd-size consumers were clearly harmed. It is
even possible for social norms to adjust so that “ﬁtted” garments are replaced by articles
of clothing that previous generations would have considered unacceptably oversized.
Our discussion of Starter indicates that full-line forcing may in some cases aid a
manufacturer in ensuring that its line is stocked in breadth suﬃcient to satisfy a variety
of consumer preferences.25 Notice, however, that our explanation for full-line forcing
does not involve cross-subsidization. Each component of the manufacturer’s line is
individually proﬁtable.26
Our paper adds one more coordination failure to the list of such failures that has
been adduced to explain the use of vertical restraints (Deneckere et al., 1996, 1997;
Marvel and McCaﬀerty, 1984). In our case the coordination failure is based on our
observation that a unit sold for inventory will not necessarily be resold by the dealer.
It is thus revenue for the manufacturer, but a potential liability for its dealer. As with
many other such coordination failures, this one can be solved by the manufacturer
retaining control over unsold goods through either consignment or returns. Indeed
Lariviere (1999) has argued that buy-back policies are an eﬀective solution to a wide
variety of problems arising from stochastic demand, and thus should be common in
settings where retail inventories are substantial. We have previously (Marvel and Peck,
1995) oﬀered some suggestions for why returns are not a panacea, but we believe that
more work needs to be done to explain why returns policies are so far from ubiquitous.
25Full-line forcing, however, presents its own set of antitrust problems. The Starter opinion suggests
that had Starter’s policy been less “vague,” it might have been interpreted as tying, a per se violation
of the antitrust laws.
26Our theory is diﬀerent from metering or other discrimination schemes that have been proposed to
explain forcing. See Burstein (1960).
24References
Areeda, Phillip E. Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles andtheir Application .
Boston: Little, Brown (1989).
Baumol, William J. “Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Struc-
ture.” American Economic Review 72 (March 1982): 1–15.
Bonanno, Giacomo and John Vickers. “Vertical Separation.” Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 36, no. 3 (March 1988): 257–65.
Burstein, M. L. “A Theory of Full-Line Forcing.” Northwestern University Law Review 55
(February 1960): 62–95.
Chandler, Alfred D, Jr. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revioution in American Busi-
ness. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press (1977).
Deneckere, Raymond; Howard P. Marvel; and James Peck. “Demand Uncertainty, In-
ventories, and Resale Price Maintenance.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, no. 3
(August 1996): 885–913.
. “Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Compe-
tition.” American Economic Review 84, no. 4 (September 1997): 619–641.
Fenton, Lois. “Look Harder for Sleeve Lengths.” St. Petersburg Times (August 22, 1999):
8F.
Friedman, Arthur. “Survey Says Shoppers Aren’t Satisﬁed.” Daily News Record 26, no.
103 (May 29, 1996): S14.
25Gal-or, Esther. “Duopolistic Vertical Restraints.” European Economic Review 35, no. 6
(August 1991): 1237–53.
Gallini, Nancy T. and Ralph A. Winter. “On Vertical Control in Monopolistic Compe-
tition.” International Journal of Industria -Organization 1, no. 3 (September 1983):
275–86.
Gould, J.R. and Lee Preston. “Resale Price Maintenance and Retail Outlets.” Economica
N.S., 32, no. 127 (August 1965): 302–312),.
Lariviere, Martin A. “Supply Chain Contracting and Coordination with Stochastic De-
mand.” In Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management, edited by Sridhar Tayur;
Ram Ganeshan; and Michael Magazine. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1999),
pp. 233–268.
Magrath, Allan J. “Lessons from the Cost Cutters; Warehouse Clubs.” Sales & Marketing
Management 145, no. 14 (November 1993): 44.
Marvel, Howard P. “The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional
Wisdom.” Antitrust Law Journal 63, no. 1(Fall 1 994): 59–92.
Marvel, Howard P. and Stephen McCaﬀerty. “Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Cer-
tiﬁcation.” RandJournal of Economics 15, no. 3 (Autumn 1984): 346–359.
Mathewson, G. Frank and Ralph A Winter. “An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints.”
RandJournal of Economics 15 (Autumn 1984): 27–38.
Mclaughlin, Patricia. “Back in Vogue; Pattern Companies Are Reissuing Fitted Styles
from the Early Part of the Century.” The Fresno Bee (September 21, 1999): E3.
26Reagan, Patricia B. “Resale Price Maintenance: A Re-examination of the Outlets Hypoth-
esis.” In Research in Law andEconomics , edited by Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., volume 9.
Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press (1986), pp. 1–12.
Rey, Patrick and Joseph Stiglitz. “The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers’ Com-
petition.” RandJournal of Economics 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 431–51.
Thompson, Susan H. “Comfort or Fashion?” Tampa Tribune (June 27, 1999): Baylife
Section, 1.
Winter, Ralph A. “Vertical Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 108, no. 1 (February 1993): 61–76.
Trans Sport Inc., v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 536 (1991).
Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F. 2d 186 (2nd Cir., 1992).




















Top row: Customer base for size 0 in response to a deviation
Middle row: Equilibrium customer base
Bottom row: Sizes oﬀered in equilibrium, each represented by .
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